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SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELECTIONS AND THE PATH AHEAD
By Prexy Nesbill
Senior Program Officer
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
July, 1994

For Don M.--Banned
it is a dry white season
dark leaves don't last, their brief lives dry out
and with a broken heart they dive down gently headed for the earth,
not even bleeding.
it is a dry white sea5on hrother,
only the trees know the pain as they still stand erect
dry like steel, their branches dry li ke wire,
indeed, it is a dry white season
but seasons come to pass.
For three days in April of 1994 and for the first time in history, South Africans of all
races voted in national and provincial elections. People turned out in breathtaking
numbers, providing the world with an astounding demonstration of mass political
participation. Many people walked 20-30 miles to vote and in some cases, due to
organizational problems, were forced to return hon1e only to come back the next
n1orning in order to vote. Some people, frail and sickly, were carried in chairs,
wheelbarrows, and on shoulders. They waited on the damp ground or on cold, dirt
school floors for hours until thei.r turn can1e for casting their ballot. This election was
unlike anything conducted in the west. People were not just voting for a program or a
candidate. It was a ballot for liberation. For the remainder of my life I will consider
myself honored to have participated in those three days. So often I have been asked
what it was like to have been there. Rarely have I been able to respond with any words
or sentences which even begin to capture all that those three days meant.
Looking back now at ,ny South Africa diary, I finally understand what my uncle felt
when describing his participation in the Internationa.1 Brigade's defense of Republican
Spain in the 1930's. He didn't say much, but often when he spoke about it, the tears
welled up in his eyes and it confused and frightened us. Now I know his tears.
ln less than four months, South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), at a
cost of approximately 700 million rand ($200 million), set up more than 9,000 polling
stations and 1,200 counting stations nationwide. They were staffed by 171,000 personnel
plus an additional 13,000 staff who had to be trained and stationed in Natal in less than
four days. Following the last minute decision of Gatsha Buthelezi's lnkatha Freedo1n
Party(IFP) to participate in the elections, the IEC immediately scra,nbled LO set up
polling stations in the Natal area and 10 redesign the ballots to include the IFP. \Vitb an
estimated 23 111illio11 eligible voters, as many IFP stickers had Lo be produced and stuck
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to the ballots. ln addition, there were 10,000 official monitors, 1,770 United Nations
observers, 320 European Union observers and more than 2,000 foreign journalists
requiring the attention of the IEC. Ao additional and significant group of observers,
many of whom were also peace monitors, came through the Ecumenical Monitoring
Project of South Africa (EMPSA) run by the World Council of Churches and__the South
.
African Council of Churches.
· ·
;

-

The first day of the three-day elections, Tuesday April 26, was set aside for people with
special needs and the elderly. One innovative approach by some IEC officials was to
conduct voter education workshops in hospitals. In many areas throughout the country,
1nobile polling stations were set up to allow hospital patients, old age home inhabitants,
and prisoners to vote. Reaching out to the jails and prisons was very important; in many
regions prisoners had to go on strike in order to get the right to vote. Many people
waited for a full day in polling station lines to vote. "A short wait," said many,
"compared to waiting for the end of 300 years of oppression under whites." The IEC was
criticized because numerous polling stations had not received enough ballots and/or
stickers. Voting was extended for an extra day in KwaZulu and other selected regions to
ensure that everyone got a chance to cast their ballot.
The biggest fear throughout the months leading to the elections was that they would
accelerate the country's armed conflict which, with over 13,000 people dead fron1
politically-related violence, was already engulfing the entire nation'. In the n1onth prior
to the elections more than 30 people were gunned down on the East Rand (Tbokoza and
Vosloorus) and more than one hundred in the Natal region. On Marcb.28, violence
came to downtown Johannesburg in the form of an Inkatha-orchestrated offensive aimed
at Shell House, the headquarters of the African National Congress. By the end of the
day 56 people bad been killed and more than 400 injured. As the election date drew
nearer, bomb attacks began to take place all over South Africa. In late March, bombs
were placed in a squatter camp in an area called Ventersdorp where voter education
training was taking place. On Sunday, the 24th of April, a car bomb exploded in
downtown Johannesburg killing 11 people and destroying th~ buildings in a two square
block area. Simultaneously, 11 other bo1nbings took place in Johannesburg at taxi ran.ks
and places designated as polling stations. Numerous bombings took place in almost all
provinces of South Africa; it was evident that this was a concerted, well-organized effort
to disrupt the voting process countrywide.
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March 18th, the Goldstone Commb,~ion of Inguiry Regarding the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation released a report that officially acknowledged for
the first time that a ''Third Force" involving senior men1bers of the South African Police
(SAP) had been involved in hit squad activities in Natal and the Transvaal; and,
additionally, had carried out many of the killings on conunuter trains where more than
300 black people were killed between 1990 and 1992.
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I saw first-hand the terror that a well placed bomb can bring about. I was standing in
front of the Empangeni Independent E lectoral Commission (IEC) office in northern
Nacal the afternoon before the elections began. The little shopping square was packed
with !EC workers, mostly young people, waiting to get their first pay checks. The day
was humid and people were tense, especially since some had been waiting si1!£e s!Jc and
seven tbat morning for their checks to be processed. Suddenly, a grayish bottle liolding
liquid and covered with rags was rolled onto the pavement about 10-12 feet in front of
me. S01neone yelled, "It's a bomb! Look out there's a bomb there!" People ran; they
sta1npeded. One small woman in braces was knocked off her feet and nearly trampled.
I ran toward the South African Police vehicle which I'd noticed earlier parked around
the corner from the shopping square. I calmly said (with immense discipline) to the two
SADF soldiers inside that I was an American observer. I bad my blue cap on, hut I
showed my credentials nonetheless. I told them there was a bomb in front of the IEC
headquarters and they should come. With due respect, I must say, they responded
inunediately--one went directly to his radio, and the other to the back of the vehicle to
grab a metal case. Within five minutes various South African armored vehicles arrived;
first, an 'Impala' followed by several 'Hippos'--both are fast moving, tank-like vehicles
111ounted on tall wheels and designed for urban and bush warfare. 2 From the Impala
came several men from the bo1nb unit. They identified the bottle as a bomb, contained
it, and sealed off the area. \Ve ,vere lucky; the bomb failed to detonate. One of the
SADF, a tall, very young, very Aryan ,nan, asked me, a little sarcastically, if I wanted a
souvenir for the States. I thanked him but declined the offer.
It is important to understand and contextualize the violence in South Africa. Its nature
and origin must be illuminated and examined. There needs to be 111uch more clari ty
about what causes the violence. It is now axio1natic, particularly in the USA, that the
violence in South Africa (like the violence throughout the African continent and maybe
wherever black people reside) is consistently perceived as "black on black," stemming
from some primordial set of African instincts and passions. As Southern African
historian and scholar, D r. Lisa Brock points out in a recent article,
A content analysis of the three major television news networks, the
top three news journals, as well as the twelve most widely read
newspapers reveals ... that news reports have largely portrayed the
conflict between Inkatha and anti-apartheid activists (the ANC,
UDF and COSATU members and supporters) as 'black-on-black

'Li ke razor wire and the razor wire spreading n1achine, these vehicles are unique ly
the products of South African militarism. They were invented out of the necessity of
going through hundreds of tiny cardboard shacks or doing crowd control "~th large mobs
of rock throwing youth.
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violence', 'tribal violence,' or 'factional fighting.''
In the article she poses the question, "why has the image of tribal warfare in South
Africa become the most persistent image from South Africa (and Africa in general)?"
Noting that the "western media creates the in1ages, the phrases, and the par<}@gm_s that
encapsulate African affairs," she concludes in a powerful argun1ent:
·
· ·
The inlages of irrational, tribal, primordial inclinations and warfare
provide the smoke and mirrors . . . [they] reflect a convergence of
market policy of news makers with the interest of powerful
corporations, white South African leaders, and Western racial
mythology.
But the reality of the violence in South Africa is far more complex than a media blip of
snarling African men with spears, just as the drug-related violence in urban America is
more multi-faceted than a few, young, heavily armed black men riding around in white
stretch lilnousines.
In general, the violence in South Africa bas largely been concentrated in black
residential areas and bas 111anifested itself in three primary forms: 1) armed
confrontations between contending small and large groups; 2) violence triggered by an
event, such as a mass march, funeral or gathering; or 3) low intensity conflict.
Categorizing the violence tends to be unproductive since much of it is all linked together.
However, it is this third type of violence, which includes inter-racial violence, that is the
most ominous. For it is here that one sees the role which the apartheid state
consistently played from the late 1970s onward by producing, maintaining and
distributing violence.
For instance, during the time I was in South Africa, news broke through the Goldstone
Commission that one of the largest regular sources of automatic weapons had been the
parastratal agency called the Electricity Supply Commission (EsKom). To cite but one
case--in late March the electricity utility sold 1,000 sem i-automatic rifles to Inkatha's
chief police training official, Mr. Phillip Powell, for the sum of 2.1 million rand. Thereby
giving the two interm.ediaries involved a profit of 1.4 million rand.
The EsKom revelation bas led to other parastatals like ISCOR (the Iron and Steel
Corporation) and SaSol revealing that they too, as part of the 1980 National Keypoints

3

see Brock, Lisa, "Inkatha: Notions of the 'Primitive' and 'Tribal' in Reporting on
South Africa," in 1-lawk, B., ed., Africa's Media Image (Praeger, 1992).
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Act designed to stop the ''total onslaught,"4 kept stocks of thousands of weapons beyond
those issued to employees {the scale of the problem is made clear by the fact that the
National Keypoints Secretariat n1anaged 7,850 security personnel at various keypoi:nt
sites). What should be noted about South Africa during the apartheid years is the South
African state created one of the world's n1ost successful arms industries by utj!izing huge,
state subsidies. The fact that some South African war products like the GS ~iid 06 long
range artillery, armored cars, the Rooivalk helicopter, and mine detection equipment, are
among.~t the world's n1ost popular military and policing equipment attests to the lengths
to which the state would go to promote and sustain the armaments indLtstry.
Further evidence of the state's responsibility for many of South Africa's 15,000 political
deaths since 1990 was provided in the March 1994 Goldstone Commission's report. A
full discussion of the scale and sophistication of this collaboration is beyond the
objectives of this commentary. Several key points however, must be n1entioned: South
African Police officers were identified as a n1ajor mode for transferring weapons from
RENAMO in Mozan1bique to lnkatha in South Africa; the Commission presented to tbe
public concrete and undeniable proof "that members of South Africa's security forces,
especially the South African Police (SAP) and the KwaZulu Police (KZP) had stoked,
sustained and orchestrated violence aimed at thwarting tbe country's de1nocratic
transformation (Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 25-30, 1994); the Conlillission
highlighted convincing evidence that elements of the KZP bad been and still were
involved in bit squad activities in Natal and the Transvaal; lastly, the Commission
showed that in the core of attacks only a few months previously in the Esakhawini area
of Northern Natal, "survivors of several massacres ca1ne back later in their capacities as
KZP police,neo to investigate the crime."
Less thao a week before the start of the elections, the man and political organization
most observers identify as tbe main source of South Africa's political violence, Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi and tbe lnKatha Freedom Party (IFP) awiounced a reversal of their
previous position. They decided to field a slate of candidates for both the national and
provincial elections. This development was major and dramatic. It is undoubtedly the
single most important reason that the South African election's were conducted in an
atmosphere of relative peace and calm. In fact, tbe total number of deaths nation-wide
Linked to the election process between January and May 1994 was only 103. While the
election days themselves were notably without the levels of violence present only days
before the elections began, violence and the threat of ,~olence remains a constant factor
in South Africa.

4

This phrase was used by the South African goverrunent from J 977 on to describe
what they believed was an offensive against South Africa led by the forces of
international communism ranging from the Soviet Union and Cuba to the United
Nations, the World Council of Churches and various city governments throughout the
United States.
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Violence manifests itself in many ways as an everyday feature of life in South Africa.
Even more than in the United States, in most conllllunities, but especially in the white
areas, guns are like pencils and pens. Everyone has them. At many white churches in
the Orange Free State there are special canisters and racks to leave your guns ( off, but
accessible) as you worship. There are jokes about adolescents taking ballroOIJ1 dancing
and constantly colliding with a gun. Restaurants and schools, especially· in ,vhite ireas,
have racks where you hang your guns as you enter. lo the late 1980s, just before the
release of Nelson Mandela and the unbannings of the major African political
organizations, South Africa's mil.lion plus legal gun holders owned an approx.in1ate 2.5
million band held firearms with 200,000 new firearm licenses being issued each year.
And this was the rate before the release of Nelson Mandela!
Most observers point to the Buthelezi decision to participate and/or to the massive
deployment of South African security forces--especially the South African army and
South African Defense Force (SADF)--as the main reasons for the success of South
Africa's elections. Others focus on the extent to which the elections were conducted with
maximal, international public visibility, i.e., the more than 10,000 international media
personnel, the 5,000 international observers and the 30,000+ national monitors and
observers. I contend that the real reason South Africa was able to conduct its elections
was the political will of the South African people. Perhaps, future generations of
scholars will identify these April 1994 days as South Africa's defining n1oment as a
nation. Tue visual inlages, the film footage, the photographs of the long, long lines, the
hilltops re-molded with row after row of people waiting hours and days to vote, all these
images simply cannot convey the significance of the South African elections.
Descriptions highlighting "the power," "the grace," "the impact," of South Africa's
mobilization for those three April days cannot succeed in acurately describing the story.
Cheryl Carolus, the ANC's overall policy coordinator, believes that the strength of the
South African democractic process lies in "the existence of a vibrant civil society."
Moreover, in a powerful and pentrating recent speech to a conference jointly sponsored
by the African American Institute and Peggy Dulany, Cheryl notes another characteristic:
Another strength in South Africa is that we are a people who
know how to make ourselves ungovernable. And it's a
wonderful strength precisly because despite the facist nantre
of the previous regime, not only did we n1anage to get on
with our Uves, but we managed to build alternative structures
which have shaped and even built the moral fabric of our
society today.5

5

"The Real Stn1ggle Begins", by Cheryl Carolus Africa Report, July-August, 1994.
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I understand fuUy what Cheryl is saying. In one school house voting station in
Natal, I watched, the whole room watched, barely breathing, as an old man was
brought in on a stretcher made from so1ueone's wooden door and white plastic:
USAID corn sacks. The stretcher was lowered to the floor right in the nliddle of
the room. It was all the wrong procedure. The old roan was entitled to pri~~y as
he cast bis ballot. He rose up a bit on his elbows. 1'he polling station's pot-· ··
bellied, balding, white presiding officer walked over--a little less officiously than
usual, without his cigar for once. The old man rose a bit further and said in his
tenor voice
with a slight
.
.
crack, "I am
i The 1?nily
G reat•·: .
t
here to vote
· By
Stephen Spe11der
' ' . -.,
.
for Mr.
Mandela." It
Ne.a r th~ snow, ne~r the sun, in the.highest fields,
was a
.. See' how these natnes are feted by the waving grass
declaration,
.Arid o.y the $!reamers of white cldud
not a
.. And wbjspers of \\find in 1he listening sky. .
statement.
Certainly no • The names of .those who in their lives fought for life,
• Who wore at their. hearts.the fire's centr.e : . .
longer a hat' . Boin the sun, they travelled a short while (()ward the SUI}
in-band.. ....
And left lbe vivid air. signed with tiheir. honour.
.. ...., ..
. ,..
head-bowedrequest to a
_,
white. The
'
official
brought a ballot and asked the old roan to point to his choice. In response and
clearly with great pain, a skinny arm extended and took the white man's arm
bringing the ballot closer to his eyes. After a long time, during which everything
stopped in the room, the same scratchy voice said, "that one sir" and an ashy bony
finger was placed on top of Mandela's caricature. The old man laid back down
saying to the still hushed room, "now I can die."

.
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I realized that day that this was what the South African elections were about.
They were a moment within a historical process. They were an integral part of
that process, just as the deaths of Steve Biko, Ruth First, Neil Aggett, Dulcie
September, Lal Naidoo, J oe Quabi, Claire Stewart, Amy Biehl, and so many
others. Part of the process like all those people wbose images I saw and dreamed
about throughout the days and nights I was in South Africa. The elections and
these departed friends were organicaUy and inextricably part of "the river" which is
South Africa's history and process. I thin.k here about the image of "the river"
because of the force and power of this assemblage of people. The voters catUe
out in numbers that were overwhelnlingly beyond any and all predictions. Near
En1pangeni, Natal, as I stood watching the lines soaking around a hillside, I asked
one trade unionist organizer--a womai1 who had been a unionist for thirty years--

•
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why she thought so many were voting. She answered, "because they murdered
Chr is Hani. They made a mistake then," she said, "a big one. The old people in
the lines have been singing a song. It means something Uke, you can blow out a
candle, but you can't blow out a fire."

South Africa--The Path Ahead

It is now several mornings after South Africa's April, 1994 e lections. There is a
new parliament and a new cabinet (the full membership is appended to thls
report) under the leadership of a man who is undisputedly the world's most
popular and charismatic political figure. But all is not nirvana in Africa's
southern tip. Given the physical, social and economic infrastructure of inequality
which will remain for n1any years to come, South Africa is now entering the most
difficu lt part of "the river." The Washington Office on Africa recently quoted
renowned Sout h African sociologist, Francis '-Ni lson, as saying in a speech to the
Southern African Grantmakers Network that South Africa, now emerging from
apartheid, is like the US when it emerged from slavery. He sta ted, "We don't
want to make "the same mistakes you made in returning to inequality under a new
guise." Today's South Africa is facing t he structural inequities and injustices of
centuries of racial oppression. Realities like poverty (over half of all African
fami lies earn less than $190 per month), unemployment (with seven million
unemployed, the unemployment rate among job seeking blacks is a nlinimum of
50%), illitera<.:y (the rural South African illiteracy rare is over 66%), homelessness
(7.7 million people homeless= 1 out of every 3.5 inhabitants) and health problems
(South Africa's HIV infection rate doubles every 13 n1onths and less than 20% of
blacks--compared to more than 80% of. whites--have medical insurance)6 are what
motivated President Nelson Mandela to observe, wi th the particular clarity he
brings to political phenomena, at Clark Atlanta University nine months before the
elections:
\Vhlle providing the rights associated with democracy, our
constitution should also create the basis for ao expanding floor of
entitlements so as to accord every citizen that rneasure of dignity
intrinsic to being human. A den1ocratic constitution must address the
issues of poverty, inequality, deprivation and want in accordance with
internationally recognized standards of the indivisibility of human
rights. A vote without food, shelter and health care would be to
create the appearance of equality while actual inequal ity is

6

For further sobering details, see the chart appended to this report from William
Minter's May 16, 1994 In These T imes ar ticle, reprinted in Covert Action Quarterly,
Sum.m er 1994.
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entrenched. We do not want freedom without bread, nor do we ,vant
bread without freedom.
President Mandela's reflection, in fact, brings me to a major concern l have about South
Africa as I look at the path ahead. It is related to the so-called ' Mandela facior', i.e.,
what happens if and when "Madhiba," as he is affectionately known, is no longer lhere. I
have no doubt that there is a plan in place. Further, I have tremendous respect for the
organization and leadership skills of other leaders, like Cheryl Carolus, Cyril Ramaposa,
Pallo Jordan, Frene Ginwala, "Bantu" Holomisa, and "Tokyo" Gabriel Sexwale, premier
of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWY) region. Amongst these and many
others--inside and outside of the parlia1nent and the government7 --is a quality of
leadership, conunitment and vision that rero.inds one of what black A1nerican theologian
and civil rights activist, Vincent Harding, calls "signposts"--people whose lives open doors
beyond darkness. There is also an impressive style of collective leadership and mutual
consultation. Both this caliber of leadership and the style are sadly absent in the USA
While there, I discussed leadership and how to develop the capacity for leadership many
times. Ironically, the many visits there of certain US personalities has made South
African activists very sensitive to a point made by Comel West in Race Matters:
: C...:..

••

We need leaders--neither saints nor sparkling television
personalities--who can situate themselves within a larger historical
narrative of this country and our world, wbo can grasp the con1plex
dynamics of our peoplehood and imagine a future grounded in the
best of our past, yet who are attuned to the frightening obstacles
that now perplex us.
Nonetheless, despite the strength of the leadership--symbolized in the very persona of the
unmatched Nels on Mandela and derived from training experiences like the university
which Mandela, Mbeki, Sisulu and many others created in their Robben Island prison
cells--! have two strong concerns about the choices which are being made by South
Africa's leadership. The first is a certain parochialism and 1nyopic vision in terms of
crucial questions regarding South Africa's relationship with Southern Africa and regional
growth and development. The second is the South African leadership's perspective on
the growing USA-South African connection.
In regard 10 the first point, Jet us remind ourselves that for years tbe neighboring
Southern African people and nations have paid with lost lives and destroyed
infrastructures for the solidarity which they gave to the South African liberation struggle.

7

A full list of the South African cabinet is appended to this note. A growing issue
voiced by some is that too many leaders have been taken from key grassroots, labor and
church organizations to serve in the governn1ent, leaving those constituencies without
direction and experienced leadership.
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Mozambique and Angola paid (and continue to pay) a particularly high portion of the
bill rendered by South African apartheid violence. It is a genocidally tragic tally that has
resulted in 1.6 million lives being lost; more than 11 million people, largely women and
children, being made homeless; over 750,000 children orphaned or abandoned; and at
least $60 billion in war damage to roads, bridges, schools, factories, nlines, fil!Q
development projects. As renowned South African lawyer and hun1an rights scholar,
Albie Sachs put it to an audience in Mozambique: "I hope you, our friends in Frelimo in
·particular, get so1ne pride in tern1s of what is happening in South Africa today because
you paid a terrible price. Half the problems today stem from the fact that you
challenged apartheid in South Africa and you gave us support." But is Albie Sach's
observation the shared feeling of most of South Africa's citizenry? Of its new
leadership? Renowned scholar and activist, Dot Keet of the University of the Western
Cape (UWC, aka "the university of the working class") shared with me her fear that
rather than being a partner for development of the region, South Africa nlight become
the agency for continuing donlination of the region and deepened patterns of
exploitation--even if stemming from ebony instead of ivory hands.
Sometimes the leadership of the ANC is much less than 'thoughtful' in both public and
private utterances about their participation in the region. When I was in South Africa
during tbe beady atmosphere of the elections, I was sturuied--as were many others--to
bear Adelaide Tambo, prominent female ANC spokesperson and wido\v of the late
President Oliver R. ·ra1nbo, say in a press interview "to hell with the region," when she
was asked about how the ANC intended to assist with the Southern African region's
multitudinous development problems. One day in an elevator, I ran into l\vo ANC staff
people whom I've known for many years. I met them when, as refugees, they were
hosted by first Tanzania, then Zambia, then Angola. They noticed that I had my bags
and asked how I could possibly be leaving prior to Mandela's inauguration celebration. I
explained that I was en route to Maputo to talk about the elections coming up there.
They replied (at first I thought they were joking, but then I soberly realized they were
not), "Oh, is Mozambique having elections too?"
While there may be problems of a n1yopic political vision and parochialism amongst
some of the ANC leadership, I think that the top leadership in the country··
governmental and nongovernmental--ren1ains committed to a political perspective that
embraces Southern Africa and not just the Republic. Clearly, this is the case witb
President l'v!andela as evidenced in the early July Pretoria meeting he hosted to bring
together the Presidents of Zaire, Angola and Mozambique. The same regional
orientation was to be found in the July 21 state visit (his first ever) which President
Mandela paid to the Mozambican capital, Maputo. During the state visit, besides sigrling
a n1ulti-faceted cooperation pact covering defense, transport, agriculture and research,
President Mandela comnlitted South Africa to both assistance with the rebuilding of all
the countries destabilized by South Africa (including Angola) and to eventually formally
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joining in SADC (the Southern Africa Development Con1IDunity).8 Interestingly, the
trade union leadership, especially the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) consistently embraces and demonstrates more regional solidarity than those
in exile in regional locations, given the fact that so many of them inside the country were
often cut off from hard information because of apartheid censorship. This is~\le will
come forward more often as the idea of the new Sou th Africa paying reparaiions:' to
Angola receives more attention.
As John Saul, author of the recently published Recolonization and Resistance: Southern

Africa in the 1990's and long time colleague/participant/observer says, "Now for the
hard part, that is the challenges before the new post-apartheid goverrunent." The second
n1ajor concern I have, i.e., the plunging roller coaster which is the growing connection
between the USA and the RSA (Republic of South Africa) brings me to the final section
of this commentary. How the substance, direction and quality of the bilateral relations
between South Africa and the United States will finally evolve is one of various serious
challenges which the new South Africa now faces.
TI1e East-West Cold War paradigm that drove US policy towards South Africa and
Africa in general is now largely dead. It has been replaced by a new framework in which
development in South Africa is motored by a market economy awash with McDonald's
and coke bottles. As Vice President Al Gore stated ( opening by citing, ironically,
W.E.B. DuBois' historic contribution) on inauguration eve at Johannesburg's Market
Theater in a speech that deserves to be quoted at length:
For the United States, this transformation (the dismantling of
apartheid) has special significance. After all, for decades Americans
agonized over the horrors of our own apartheid.... \Ve start on this
partnership from a strong similarity and outlook. President-to-be
Mandela... has committed himself and bis government to an
economic policy and progran1 that eschews failed ideologies... the
businessmen and women of the United States are genuinely
excited.... We know how good it can be.... We want 'io join South
Africans in helping to rebuild the economy... to expand opportunities
for the previously disadvantaged to be successful entrepreneurs in

8

SADC's current membership is: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Moza111hique,
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zi.Inbabwe. South Africa joining SADC in a
substantive and serious way could be an extraordinary development. In 1990, for
instance, South Africa's GNP was $102 billion, three times as much as the $30 biUion
dollars combined GNP of the ten current SADC members. The add itional point to bear
in mind though is that it is not automatic that South Africa joining SADC will lead to a
strengthened SADC and more equitable and sustai nable development throughout the
region.
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order to share in the dynamic growth of the economy.
Perhaps a Christian Science Monitor article (June 6, 1994) said it best when it ;headlined
"US Pushes South Africa as a Model." The accelerating US involvement in South Africa
is not directed at the 7 million homeless South Africans or the 25% living in itbject
poverty. Rather, as James Hackney, counsellor to US Secretary of ComJnerce Ron
Brown, notes (in the article cited above): "...we're l9oking at a $20 billion opportunity
for foreign firms over the next four to five years." Many key US firms are yet to venture
towards South Africa. For them, Africa remains a continent non grata. And sadly, many
now advancing on South Africa do so moved by the opportunity to cut some deals (see
the June 5, 1994 Washington Post article entitled "USIA Hosts Deal-Making Conference
for US and South African Firms") rather than make a contribution to South Africa's
reconstruction and growth ..
J e....

"

So it is that I left South Africa concerned about the McDonaldization going on, a process
of absorbing all things American that is building upon a long and developed historical
tendency to Jove and emulate 'the Yanks!' As I traveled around South Africa this trip
and kept seeing the US automobiles, television shows, C.D.s, fashions, ,novies, 100,000
phrase super talk barbies, computers, etc., I kept hearing in my head the Michael Jordan
'Be Like Mike' ditty.
My concern is derived not only from the fact that the log cabin-to-white house mythology
has not worked any to well for large segments of the USA population. Nor is it just the
product of serious doubt that the Clinton administration at the end of the day will
produce what it says it will pro.duce (For example, the so-called new policy towards
A,ngola has not resulted in any substantive change in policy). And already facts like how
the $600 1nillion new funds Clinton promised South Africa ,vill, in reality, simply be old
funds drawn from moneys promised to other African countries make me join Africa
Policy Information Center Director, Imani Countess when she observes "the most
substantive changes contemplated seem to be organizational (and ornamental) rather
than substantive, perhaps a trip by President Clinton to the new South African success
story.'"
··
My concern about the USA-RSA nexus also stems from the scale and complexity of the
problems which South Africa confronts. In I 991 the US government committed to help
Mozambique with its crises through a massive infusion of aid. That year 3,000 foreign
technicians earned $180 million, three times the entire wage bill of Mozambique's

•Are we going to now take funds designated for crisis aid in places like Rwanda and
shift it to South Africa or are we going to now shift newly promised South Africa-bound
funding and shift it back to Rwanda? Obviously, what is missing is major commitment to
Africa on the part of US decision makers. "Dead African children are like dead flies to
the Americans," one friend in Maputo siad to me.
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100,000 member civil service including teachers and health care workers. How, in light
of this record and what I know of the USA, I find myself at times querying, will flooding
South Africa with US technicians, consultants and peace corps help address tasks like
creating training programs and jobs for 2.5 million people over tbe next 5 to 10 years?
Or another case, what wisdom can the US offer, given US attitudes towards 112vernment
intervention into health care, ii1 a situation where to create a mininnun health delivery
system in South Africa will require an initial government injection of $300 million per
year?
Challenges: Old, Continuing and New
President Nelson Mandela said in bis inspiring and poetic May 10 inaugural speech that
"our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce an actual South African realily
that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice, strengthen its confidence in the nobility of
the human soul and sustain all our hopes for a glorious life for all ...." He closed by
saying tbat "the sun shall never set on so glorious a buman achievement."
Related to President Mandela's epiphany and an illustration of its application to
"ordinary South Africans" is a story that a friend told me. He said that he and his father
were in a medium sized food shop purchasing on the first day of elections. The shop
was crowded for such an early morning. But then, it was a special day. Suddenly, it
became a bit quiet when an older, homeless, 'coloured lady,' wearing a warm red shawl ,
began pan-handling all the customers and employees, a little in the celebrant n1ode.
Each of them gave her something and steadily the realization grew that nearly all had
done that. They, especially a fat n1anager, began to hassle her, telling her it was time to
leave and that she couldn't keep getting food off each of them. The old lady walked out
in a slow dignified march. When she reached the doorway, she turned and pointed her
finger at all of them. She said, voice rising to the occasion, ".Mandela's taking over
tomorrow. He's coming to take care of each and every one of you people!!" Then she
turned, squared her shoulders, shook her butt and left.
What Madhiba's words and tbe old woman's action together constitute is a telescopic
view of the con1prehensiveness of the challenges facing the new South African
government. Tremendous tasks lie ahead. First, there is the need co transform political,
economic and social institutions which for the last three centuries have been the building
blocks of apartheid. A system of social relations forged almost wholly within a raciallybased, socially engineered modality of super exploitation, must be turned into a nonracist society. How to reach the goal of a non-racist, non-sexist society? The ANC has
decided that by working with other political parties in a government of national unity,
steps can be taken towards healing the bitter racial scars of white oppression while
combining black aspirations and labor with white capital and know-bow, thus making
South Africa a viable contributing partner in Africa. It has yet to articulate, however,
detailed and specific plans for eliminating the racism and racial privilege and
chauvinism that yet abounds throughout South Africa.
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A related task that must be confronted in a radical, substantive and sustained manner is
that of transforming South African society so that women can fully and equally
participate. Today, the reality often totally contradicts the rhetoric of a non-racist; nonsexist, non-homophobic society. Women are abused, objectified, exploited, and
brutalized in all aspects of their lives. Ultimately, perhaps, the essential prer~quisite to
asserting and achieving full equality and participation for women in South Africa ·is going
to be the extent to which women organize, but in the meanwhile it must be noted that
simply passing a non-sexist constitution and bill of rights is a far cry from the elimination
of gender oppression and exploitation.
J

-

••

Secondly, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) must be implemented in
a timely and highly public fashion. It is fully understood by almost all in South Africa
that the election victory is only a first step, that electing Nelson Mandela is meaningless;
it is urinating on the graves of all those who sacrificed their lives unless real change
begins to appear confronting the daily misery which most black South Africans face.
Apartheid in a sense was non-discriminating. Whether through the inequality it
ensconced, the underdevelopment and ignorance it sowed, or the violence it inculcated
as the synapse of all people's existence, "there is not a single sector of South African
society, nor a person living in South Africa untouched by the ravages of apartheid."
Moreover, just as millions of South Africans suffered as a result of apartheid policies,
practices and violence, mill.ions of ordinary South Africans also struggled in various ways
against apartheid. Because of this legacy of mass struggle and mass aspirations, the
ANC adopted an approach to change linking "growth," "development," "reconstruction,"
and "redistribution" into one unified program based on the concept that their people with
their aspirations and collective determination are their most important resource. The
five key elements of the RDP are :
• meeting basic needs
• developing human resources
• building the economy
• democratizing the state and society
• and most of all, implementing the RDP
It is an ambitious undertaking and many, many details ren1ain to be fully understood, let
alone introduced into people's everyday lives. But the 39 billion Rand ($11 billion US)
RDP is, at minimum, a plan to provide jobs, houses, education and health care to the
millions brutalized by apartheid. Indeed, some aspects of the RDP are breath takingly
ambitious and as I listened to people explain it throughout the country, I wondered why
we in the world's richest country could not share the admirable aim of goals like seeing
everyone live in a house.
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True enough, the RDP will be difficult to actualize, but it represents a generalized will
to put seven million people now in squatter camps into a million units of low-cost
housing in the next five years; a will to electrify 2.5 million households by the year 2000
despite the constraint of a shrinking economy and a growing world recession. Most of
all, what strikes me as adntirable and unique is that the RDP results from a .erocess of
envisionn1ent and participation that took place throughout tbe country over a· period of
more than a year. The RDP also continues an impressive tradition of consulting with
people and providing the political space for people to participate that was sta rted in 1955
when thousands of Africans, coloured, Indians and whites gathered defiantly at Kl iptown,
outside Johallllesburg, to debate a nd adopt the world-renown Freedon1 Charter.
A thi rd major challenge which faces the new South Africa is what I identify as the
disarming of South African society. l t entails the demilitarization of South Africa, the
denuclearization of tbe country and gaining control over a defense and arms industry
gone wild. Several days spent with a South African brigadier, who had led SADF forces
in Angola, Namibia, and Soweto gave me much insight into the nature of the military
mindset in South Africa. \Ve were together at the May, 1994 Cairo Conference on
Peace Keeping in Africa sponsored by the International Peace Academy. I was sitting
behind the brigadier and I listened as he derisively mocked every plan brought forward
for introducing multilateral peacekeeping contingents into confict situations so as to
minimize loss. "My perspective," be said, "is simple. You must simply deploy the boys
better armed, better equipped, better trained, better led, better fighters and ready to run
it." His forces bad learned from the Americans in Vietnam that the best kind of
peacekeeping was "grab them by the balls and the hearts and minds will follow!"
Indications of the scale of conversion that must take place in South Africa are also
evident in the amazing informati on that is now being unearthed about bow sophisticated
South Africa's military and nuclear programs have become. David Albright's article in
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (June 1994) about South Africa's six gun-type, easily
transported nuclear weapons built by government-owned Armscor are but the proverbial
tip of the iceberg in terms of potential South African military and nuclear capacity. And
the intensity of the debate now raging in South Africa aboui how to convert from a warcentered polity to a n1ore normalized country where war i.s a component part, is at a
level far deeper and more generalized than the conversion debate being conducted in the
USA Tbe quotations below, excerpted from a discussion paper "The Annan,ents
Industry Debate: A Cost Benefit Approach" (June, 1994), give a flavor of the challenge.
Currently, the paper is being circulated in the ANC's Department of Econo1nic Planning.
... Arms control policy must stem from foreign policy, not the o ther
way round. Unless this happens, the battle-testing in countri es like
Yugoslavia, and arms exports to countries like Rwanda could
dan1age our post apartheid credibility.... Today many nations that
have invested heavily in defence in the past have turned their
attention to converting defence activities into competitive

'
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commercial activity. While the results have not been promising,
South Africa should also seek to establish how the heavy investment
in militarisn1 of the past can be turned into civilian focused benefits.
Government is especially important in this regard since defense
conversion requires a nation effort."
A fourth immediate challenge facing South Africa is that of the local level elections
scheduled for the fall of 1994. Presumably, these will not be conducted until conditions
permit them to be held simultaneously in towns and nJTal areas throughout the country.
And theoretically already in place are transitional local authorities who are to deal with
administration and maintenance of local services (roads, water, electricity, sewage,
drainage, fire departments, hospitals, n1useums, etc.) until the local elections are held.
These transitional local authori ties were to emerge from local level negotiations being
held throughout the country, a process which usually involved black township
representation or the civic associations ("civics") negotiating with nearby white city
councils. However, there are problems, big ones. The immediate problems have been
both juridical and political. They have involved delineating boundaries of authority,
where cities end, where suburbs begin, how the political parties get integrated into the
process and bow the newly evolving local authorities relate to provincial and national
structures. There are also essentially political problems like getting white councils to
negotiate in good faith with black communities or getting black local residents to end
years of rent boycotts and other tax resistance traditions so as to garner the revenues
needed to run the new society's services and facilities (incidentally, in the midst of all
this, South Africa's right wing has determined that local government will be their new
strategic terrain on which to contest for power in many key areas). These are problems
linked to the much bigger ones discussed ealier like the de-racialization of society.
But in a way the local elections challenge is not an unpredictable one. As with other
tasks, like creating a new national and inclusive culture reflective of all the rich mosaic
of peoples, languages, and habits which South Africa offers, this is part of the new
pathway which is being travelled in South Africa. President. Mandela, a long tune
student of other situations where there was harsh and qu ick transition from liberation
movement to government, pointed out in his May 9 address at Cape Town that the "task
on hand would not be easy." And, in general, the mood amongst thirty year friends and
colleagues that I talked to when I was there for those days, while jubilant, also contained
a measure of grim acknowledgement that ahead are the (llOSt difficult portions of the
journey. It's all part of waking up in the morning in the new South Africa.
Pallo Jordan, a pal from Madison, Wisconsin during bis exiled childhood (before being
banished from the USA), now the Minister of Posts, Telecommunication and
Broadcasting, said to me as he embraced 1ne at a 1nid-elections celebration, "now I
understand why the Angolans changed their slogan fron1 'A Luta Continua. A Vitoria e
Certa!' [I'he stn1ggle continues. Victory is Certain] to 'A Vitoria Continua. A Luta e
Certa!' [Victory is a continuous (process). Struggle will definitely he there].
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Poverty and homelessness ·.will challenge th e n ew ANC
government. The legacy of inequality and deprivation from
apartheid South Africa is staggerin g:
~- The GDP growth rate has declined from almost 6% in the 1960s, to 4%.
. 1n ihe.1970s, to barely 1% in the 198Qs.
-~. ..Per,dipita income has d~liried i~ each of the past12 years.
,·· ·.
,:} .• 'o~er·half of black .families and 2.6% of white families live in extreme .:;,
·'
pove;ty.
· ···,. · :
' ::..
• At least 7 million are homeless.
• .Millions of blacks Jive in shacks with no sewage systems, water, or
electricity.
• Half the popu lation is illiterate.
• Malnutrition causes 61 % of infant deaths a1nong black families.
• Per capital income for whites is 9.5 times higher th~n for blacks, 4.5 times
higher than fo r mixed races, and 3 tin1es higher than that for Asians.
• Of the 36 countries for which data are avai lable, it has the most unequal
development: The poorest 40% of households earn 4% of total income,
the richest I 0% earned n1ore than 50%.
• Only 1.6%ofdirectorships in the top lOOcompanieson the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE) are held by black Africans.
• Five corporations own 80% of all stocks traded on the JSE.
• Of the 3 black-owned con1panies traded, nvo ,vere establish.:d last year.
• All black-owned businesses account for less th,1n l '?tof econon1icoutput.
• Black Africans fill l %of senior rnanage n1en t positions, co,npared to 98%
held by ,vhites.
• Fe,ver than 10% of the 700,000 A Frie.in busin,~s~es ,ire in n1:111ufacw ri ng
o r related fields.
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